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Abstract. The task of this paper is to introduce a new lightweight identification protocol
based on biometric data and elliptic curves. In fact, we combine biometric data and asymetric
cryptography, namely elliptic curves and standard tools to design a multifactor identification
protocol. Our scheme is light, very fast, secure and robust against all the known attacks on
identification protocol. Therefore, one can use it in any constraint device such as embedded
systems.
Keywords: Elliptic curves cryptography, biometric data, identification protocol, challenge-
response, privacy, zero-knowledge.
1 Introduction
In the era of ubiquitous computing, the need to know the identity and authenticity of the entity
with which we communicate and ensure the privacy of users has become essential. This new era
has brought a new cryptography for low-resource devices such as sensor networks, RFID tags,
smartphone, smart cards . . . . This is called ’lightweight cryptography’. Design an effective protocol
that meets all the security requirements of small devices with limited resources is a challenge.
According to [19], it is possible but difficult to find a compromise between performance and security,
performance and cost or cost and security. Thus, a large number of researchers in recent years that
engage in the search for solutions Security and privacy in these smart devices [23].
Much of the research on the safety of these devices focus more on identification protocols [1,26].
For instance, when several of these heterogeneous objects communicate with each other or with
other computer systems, they do not have a direct view of their interlocutors. Thus, to identify
and recognize the different actors in a communication it is important to identify them.
Nevertheless, the user’s identity becomes a key factor of a system, it is necessary to ensure the
legitimacy of the claimed identity, in order to avoid situations such as identity theft or stealing
identity and non-repudiation. We must not only identify the entity, but also authenticate, ensure
safely of his identity.
Indeed, in [26] the authors propose a set of burglar extremely lightweight authentication schemes
such as challenge-response using logic and basic arithmetic operations, which can be used in RFID
systems to authenticate tags. Some protocols of the latter were found to be weak and cryptanalyzed
[23,9].
In RFID systems, sensor networks, smart cards, ldots, most of the protocols used for identi-
fication using standard cryptographic primitives that are most often based on the random oracle
model [5,16,12,14,4,8,18,17,22]. With the limitations of these devices, the solid support of cryp-
tographic primitives is not optimal. The use of standard cryptographic hash functions is beyond
the capabilities of these devices. Therefore, there is a strong need for new lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives that can be supported by these tools to limited resources such as deterministic
randomness extractors on elliptic curves [3,6,7].
The Schnorr’s identification protocol is used in environments with limited resources since it
offers a good level of security while respecting the constraints posed by these technologies [24].
The security of this protocol is based on the difficulty of extracting the discrete logarithm in
suitable finite fields.
In this paper, we propose a new lightweight identification protocol for limited-resources devices.
In fact, our protocol is designed for any elliptic curve defined over the finite field K, where K can
ar
X
iv
:1
40
8.
59
45
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
0 A
ug
 20
14
2 Abdoulaye Mbaye and Abdoul Aziz Ciss and Oumar Niang
be a prime or a binary field. However, we used the Edwards elliptic curve to gain complexity and
contract side channel attacks [15,2]. We also use deterministic encodings to map random elements
of the base field to a point of the curve [25] and also deterministic randomness extractors to derive
suitably random bit-string from a a random point of the elliptic curve [3,6,7]. Our protocol is secure
under the standard model assuming the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Elliptic curves
Definition An elliptic curve E over a field K can be described as the subset of K ×K satisfying
the equation
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
for a given a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 ∈ K, along with another special point ”at infinity” O. An additional
demand is that the curve be ”smooth”, which means that the partial derivatives of the curve has
no common zeros. This can be reduced to checking that some invariant value ∆ (the discriminant
of the curve) which is calculated from the coefficients is not zero.
Fig. 1: An elliptic curve (corresponding to the equation y2 = x3 − 6x)
Depending on the characteristic of K, the above equation can be simplified. There are three
cases to consider:
1. When char(K) 6= 2, 3 the equation can be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ K.
2. When char(K) = 2 and a1 6= 0, the equation can be simplified to y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b with
a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If a1 = 0, the equation can be simplified
to y2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b with a, b, c ∈ K. This curve is said to be supersingular.
3. When char(K) = 3 and a21 6= −a2, the equation can be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax2 + b with
a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If a21 = −a2, the equation can be simplified
to y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be supersingular.
Group Structure. The structure of the group of an elliptic curve highly depends on the under-
lying field. Over a finite field K = Fq (q a power of a prime), the order of the curve is, of course,
finite. However, it is not easy to know in general what is the exact number of points on the curve.
A reasonable estimate is given by Hasse’s theorem, which shows that the order is roughly q + 1,
with a square-root bound on the error. More precisely, if #E(Fq) is the number of points on the
curve E over Fq, then |#E(Fq)− (q + 1)| ≤ 2√q
Knowing the order of the curve is very important when using curves for cryptographic pur-
poses. There exist algorithms for computing the order, but they are quite complicated and not
very efficient. Thus, sometimes a different approach is used - first the order is chosen, and then a
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suitable curve for that order is generated.
Addition Formulas - The Prime Field Case. We consider now the case K = Fp for p > 3 prime
(however, for any K such that charK 6= 2, 3 our description is essentially the same). In this case let
E be a curve defined by y2 = x3 +ax+ b. Given two points on the curve P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2)
we first consider the case x1 6= x2 (and so P 6= ±Q). The line passing both in P and Q has slope
y2−y1
x2−x1 and so its equation is y = y1 +
(
y2−y1
x2−x1
)
(x− x1).
Substituting y into the curve’s equation yields a complicated equation of degree 3 in x; however,
since we already know of two roots to the equation x1, x2 we can find the third one x3 by using the
fact that −(x1 + x2 + x3) equals the coefficient of x2 in the equation, which is exactly the square
of the slope,
(
y2−y1
x2−x1
)
Hence we have
x3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
− x1 − x2
Given x3, finding y3 is easy, and we see that
y3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1
When adding a point P = (x1, y1) to itself the only difference is the calculation of the slope,
which in this case is the tangent to the curve at x1, hence the implicit derivative
3x21+a
2y1
. This yields
the equations
x3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
− x1 − x2
and
y3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1
Addition Formulas - The Binary Field Case. In the binary case K = F2, the curve E is
defined by y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. First note that the negative of a point S = (x, y) is defined
as −S = (x, x + y), and it can be checked that the point −P indeed lies on E. For two points
P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) (denote P + Q = (x3, y3)), the easiest cases are P = ∞ or Q = ∞. By
the group law, it holds that P +∞ = P and ∞ + Q = Q. In the case of P = −Q, the result is
P +Q =∞.
The remaining two cases are P = Q and P 6= Q.
If P = Q, we need to double the coordinate, where λ = x1 +
y1
x1 is the slope of the tangent,
analogue to the prime case. As resulting x-coordinate one gets x3 = a+ λ
2 + λ.
If P 6= Q, the slope of the connecting line is y1+y2x1+x2 (note that addition and subtraction are
the same in binary field arithmetic). It holds that x3 = a+ λ
2 + λ+ x2 + x1 (in the case P = Q,
x2 + x1 = x1 + x1 = 0).
Finally in both cases the y-coordinate is computed as y3 = (x2 + x3)λ + x3 + y2. The overall
algorithm derived from the formula requires 3 multiplications (one is squaring), one multiplicative
field inversion, and 9 (or 6 in case of doubling) additions. While the additions are very cheap
operations, computing the inverse could be avoided by using projective coordinates as described
in ??.
Point Multiplication. Scalar point multiplication is a frequently used operation in the cryp-
tosystem we implemented and it is of big importance to implement this efficiently. We want to
compute kP = Q for a scalar k and a point P . Using only addition, one could compute this as
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P + ...+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, with a complexity of O(k). A better way is to use the additive equivalent of the square-
and-multiply algorithm. There, k is processed bit-wise. In each iteration, the result is doubled, and
if the bit equals one, P is added. Let [klog k, ..., k1] be the bit-representation of k, with k1 as the
least significant bit:
1. Q =∞
2. for i = 1.. log k:
3. Q = 2Q
4. if ki = 1: Q = Q+ P
The complexity of this algorithm is O(log k). There are some optimizations to this algorithm,
most notably the replacement of the binary representation of k with its non-adjacent form which
results in a shorter representation.
Note that for sake of efficiency and the need to avoid the most known attacks on elliptic curve
point multiplication, new family of elliptic curves were introduced, namely Edwards elliptic curves
[cite Edwards], Hessian Elliptic curves [cite Hessian], Huff model [cite Huff].
Randomness extractors.
For q = p a prime number > 5 let’s recall the extractor of Chevalier et al. in [?]
Definition 1. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fp, for a prime p > 2. Let G
be a subgroup of E(Fp) and let k be a positive integer. Define the function
Lk : G −→ {0, 1}k
P 7−→ lsbk(x(P ))
The following lemmas state that Lk is a deterministic randomness extractor for the elliptic curve
E
Lemma 1. Let p be a n-bit prime, G a subgroup of E(Fp) of cardinal q generated by a point P0,
q being an l-bit prime, UG a random variable uniformly distributed in G and k a positive integer.
Then
∆(Lk(UG), Uk) ≤ 2(k+n+log2(n))/2+3−l,
where Uk is the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k.
Proof. See [?].
Corollary 1. Let e be a positive integer and suppose that
k ≤ 2l − (n+ 2e+ log2(n) + 6).
Then Lk is a (UG, 2−e)-deterministic extractor
Consider now the finite field Fpn , where p > 5 is prime and n is a positive integer. Then Fpn is
a n-dimensional vector space over Fp. Let {α1, α2, . . . , αn} be a basis of Fpn over Fp. That means,
every element x of Fpn can be represented in the form x = x1α1 + x2α2 + . . . + xnαn, where
xi ∈ Fpn . Let E be the elliptic curve over Fpn defined by the Weierstrass equation
y2 + (a1x+ a3)y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6.
The extractor Dk, where k is a positive integer less than n, for a given point P on E(Fpn),
outputs the k first Fp-coordinates of the abscissa of the point P .
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Definition 2. Let G be a subgroup of E(Fpn) and k a positive integer less than n. Define the
function Dk i
Dk : G −→ Fpk
P = (x, y) 7−→ (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
where x ∈ Fpn is represented as x = x1α1 + x2α2 + . . .+ xnαn, and xi ∈ Fpn .
Lemma 2. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq, whit q = pn and let G be a subgroup of
E(Fpn). Let Dk be the function defined above. Then,
Col(Dk(UG) ≤ 1
pk
+
4
√
q
|G|2
and
∆(Dk(UG), UF
pk
) ≤ 2
√
pn+k
|G|
where UG is uniformly distributed in G and UF
pk
is the uniform distribution in Fpk .
Proof. See [?]
Lemma 3. Let p > 2 be a prime and E(Fpn) be an elliptic curve over Fpn and G ⊂ E(Fpn) be a
multiplicative subgroup of order r with |r| = t and |p| = m and let UG be the uniform distribution
in G. If e > 1 is an integer and k > 1 is an integer such that
k ≤ 2t− 2e− nm− 4
m
,
then Dk is a (Fkp, 2−e)-deterministic randomness extractor over the elliptic curve E(Fpn).
Proof. See [?]
Hashing into elliptic curves. Many cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves require
efficient hashing of finite field elements into a given elliptic curve Password based authentication
protocols give a context where hashing into elliptic curves is sometimes required. For instance,
the SPEKE (Simple Password Key Exchange) [6] and the PAK (Password Authenticated Key
Exchange) [4] protocols both require a hash algorithm to map the password into a point of the
curve. The Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme is another context of use of hashing
into elliptic curves. See [3] for a short survey of applications.
Many hash functions into elliptic curves were proposed. In 2009, Icart introduced and studied
such hash functions [3]. More precisely, let Ea,b be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field Fq,
with p = char(Fq) ≥ 5, given by the Weierstrass equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
where a, b ∈ Fq. Let E(Fq) denote the set of Fq-rational points on Ea,b, including the point at
infinity O.
For q ≡ 2 mod 3, Icart [3] proposed the following map
fa,b : F∗q −→ Ea,b(Fq)
u 7−→ (x, y)
where
x =
(
v2 − b− u
2
27
)1/3
+
u2
3
and y = ux+ v,
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with
v =
3a− u4
6u
,
and f(u) = O if u = 0.
Many other encoding maps into (hyper)elliptic curves were proposed, namely for Edwards curves
[elligator, square elligator], Hessian Curves [Cite hash Hess], hyperelliptic curves [indifferent...]
Hashing into Edwards curves : Elligator (Bernstein et. al 2013) Let Ed be an Edwards
curve defined over Fq by
x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2,
with d 6= 0, 1 is not a square. Define the quadratic character
χ : Fq −→ Fq, a 7−→ a(q−1)/2
If a is a non-zero square, then χ(a) = 1; if a is a non-square, then χ(a) = −1; if a = 0, then
χ(a) = 0
Lemma 4. Let q be a prime power congruent to 3 modulo 4. Let s be a nonzero element of Fq
with (s2 − 2)(s2 + 2) 6= 0. Define c = 2/s2. Then c(c − 1)(c + 1) 6= 0. Define r = c + 1/c and
d = −(c + 1)2/(c − 1)2. Then, r 6= 0, and d is not a square. The following elements of Fq are
defined for each t ∈ Fq − {±1} :
u = (1− t)/(1 + t), v = u5 + (r2 − 2)u3 + u
X = χ(v)u, Y = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(v)χ(u2 + 1/c2)
x = (c− 1)aX(1 +X)/Y, y = (rX − (1 +X2))/(rX + (1 +X2))
Furthermore x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
Definition 3. In the situation of Lemma 4, the decoding function for the complete Edwards curve
E : x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 is the function φ : Fq −→ E(Fq) defined as follows : φ(±1) = (0, 1); if
t /∈ {±1} then φ(t) = (x, y).
Lemma 5. In the situation of Definition 3, assume that q is prime, and define b = blog2(q)c. Let
σ : {0, 1}b −→ Fq by σ(τ0, τ1, . . . , τb−1) =
∑
i τi2
i. Define S = σ−1({0, 1, 2, . . . , (q − 1)/2}). Let ι
be the function ι : S −→ E(Fq), ι(τ) = φ(σ(τ)). Then #S = (q + 1)/2; ι is an injective map from
S to E(Fq) and ι(S) = φ(Fq).
2.2 Identification protocols
It is well known that patterns of identification are very important to cryptography and computer
security.
An authentication protocol is a part of an identification pattern. An identification system is com-
posed of two protocols appointed registration and identification between two parties. In an iden-
tification scheme basic, recording ends with both parties sharing a secret key that both need to
store safely. In general, authentication protocols are based on one or more of the following factors.
1. What you are ? Biometrics.
2. What you have ? Smart cards, SIM cards, or similar computers working.
3. What you know ? Passwords, PIN codes, secret keys.
In this section, we focus on purely cryptographic authentication protocols, in which a successful
prover must know where to have some secret key. The general objective of authentication protocols
in cryptographic constructions is to reduce the computation time for the prover and/or verifier.
These protocols are usually three to four rounds.
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The aim of the adversary in an identification scheme is identity theft or to attack the system so
that it behaves like a cheater prover and attempts to identify the honest verifier. With the existence
of the opponent attempting to impersonate three common attacks are generally considered, passive
attacks, active and simultaneous attacks. Therefore, the security against these attacks has become
a major concern in cryptography, where the analysis and creation of identification systems are
widely studied.
The principle of zero-knowledge is used as the identification scheme. It is used especially in
the context of digital signatures, often on smart card. Many protocols exist, and many variations
evolving despite the findings of some security vulnerabilities.
Fiat and Shamir [11] have faith first proposed an interactive identification scheme for zero-
knowledge, also involving two parts: a prover P and a verifier V , where the prover convince spineless
the verifier knowledge of a secret without revealing any information other than the fact that he
knows the secret.
Then a lot of identification based on zero-knowledge protocol knowledge have been proposed: we
include in particular Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS) [10] , Schnorr [24] and Guillou-Quisquater(GQ) or
Ohta-Okamoto [20]. We detail the Schnorr identification on elliptic curves in the following protocol.
The Guillou-Quisquater scheme (QM) is based on the problem of inversion of RSA. Very close
to the protocol Schnorr, they show that their scheme is secure against passive attacks, provided
the difficulty of factorization.
Ohta and Okamoto (OO) present a modification of the Fiat-Shamir scheme based on the diffi-
culty of extracting the ith root and they prove their scheme is secure as the Fiat-Shamir scheme.
In [21], Okamoto’s identification scheme exists in three version. The first is based on the discrete
logarithm problem, the second one on the RSA problem and the last on the factorization problem.
All these schemes have been proven secure against the passive attack.
One of the simplest and most frequently used knowledge proofs, proof of knowledge of a discrete
logarithm is due to Schnorr. It provides evidence of a zero-knowledge prover is in possession of
also known as proof of knowledge given secret. A challenge c is used to verify the identity of the
prover without ever revealing the secret s.
It may well be used in the environment forced on all devices with limited resources, since it offers
a good level of security while respecting the constraints posed by these technologies.
In Figure ??, we present the native version of Schnorr identification scheme over an elliptic curve
Fig. 2: ECSchnorr identification scheme.
Where n denotes the order of the elliptic curve s as the secret key, r as Escrow, c as a challenge
and y as challenge-response. All points of the elliptic curve are given in capitals where P is the
base point of the curve X is the point of control, and Z is the point that corresponds to the public
key.
Description Protocol
1. Key Generation: To generate a key pair, the prover sends a hazard s
∫
R
Zn. Its private key is
s and the public key is Z = sP .
2. Commitment phase: To engage, the prover sends a random number r intRZn and calculates
X = rP . It then sends X to the verifier.
3. Challenge phase: The verifier chooses a random number c
∫
R
Z2t and sends the prover.
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4. Response phase: The prover then computes y = r − (s ∗ c) mod n, it returns to the verifier.
5. Verification: The verifier checks if X = yP + cZ which case the identification is successful.
The protocol is secure against passive opponents, but it is not protected against active and
concurrent attacks.
Many patterns of light identifications were proposed in the literature for use on lightweight
cryptographic devices as in [13].
3 Our protocol
This section introduces the main result of the paper. In fact, we propose a new lightweight weak-
strong identification protocol secure under the standard model, using elliptic curves and biometric
data. The idea is to combine two kind of identification schemes : biometric based authentication
and challenge-response identification.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field Fq, where q is a prime power. Denote
E(Fq) be the set of Fq-rational points over E. Let
h : B −→ E(Fq)
u 7−→ Q = (x, y)
be a hash function into the elliptic curve, where B denote the set of biometric data which can
be viewed as bit-strings. h can be the Icart function for elliptic curves in Weierstrass form or the
Elligator when working with Edwards elliptic curves.
Alice, the claimant (the prover) maps her biometric data b (a bit-string consisting the combi-
nation of fingerprint and retinal scan or voice scan) to a point B of the elliptic curve E using
function h. She also select a random integer α, computes s = Extk(αB), where Extk may be the
function Lk or Dk, and sends the couple (B, s) to the verifier (Bob) through asymetric cryptogra-
phy methods. For instance, B can be encrypt using the public key of the verifier. Therefore, the
claimant and the verifier share the same secret (B, s), which is used for weak authentication. Here,
B play the role of a password.
Setup phase. The claimant
1. Chooses a random point P ∈ E(Fq) with order l and computes .
2. Computes
C = αP +B
3. Sends P and C to the verifier
4. Keeps secrete the values α
Identification phase. Let C be the claimant and V be the verifier
1. C chooses a random value r <R l, computes D = rP − αB and sends D to V
2. V chooses and sends to C a random value e ∈ {1, . . . , 2t−1}, where t is the security parameter
3. C computes y = r − eα and sends y to V
4. Upon receiving y, V verifies if
Extk(yP −D − e(B − C)) = s
Theorem 1. The verification process is correct.
Proof. In fact,
yP −D − e(B − C) = (r − eα)P − (rP − αB)− e(−αP )
= αB
Thus,
Extk(yP −D − e(B − C) = Extk(αB) = s
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Theorem 2. Assume the hardness of DLP and the randomness of the biometric data, then the
proposed identification protocol is secure against direct impersonation attacks.
Specifically,
Proof. The goal of the adversary is to impersonate the prover. To achieve this task, he has to solve
the equation y = r − eb, where b is the unknown. The value of b can be derived from the public
parameter C = αP +B, ie. αP = C −B if the adversary knows the value of B and can solve also
the DLP over E at the same time. In other words, as far as the DLP is hard, our proposition is
secure.
Conclusion
Based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm and the rarity of an authentication protocol
based on the standard model for lightweight cryptography, we proposed a zero-knowledge protocol
identification by combining for example biometrics which provides better efficiency. As proposed
in Section 3, this protocol uses a hash function or Elligator, Icart and randomness extractor. This
allows to increase the performance, the safety and the cost in the identification. We also showed that
our protocol is secure against impersonation of active attacks. Therefore, the proposed identification
system is more desirable than the existing systems for these light technology.
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